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Original features 
How much should be invested into safety, or how much safety is enough? 
These questions have been tormenting seamen, engineers, and 
businessmen for as long as cargo and people have been transported over the 
sea. To sustain trust, society in a wider sense set minimum safety 
requirements, balancing between the protection of life, cargo, and the 
environment and the business aspect. However, every new major accident 
caused the very same requirements to be raised, indicating that they clearly 
lagged behind the true demands for safety. Instead of continuing along this 
path and analysing future risks in order to further improve the quality of 
minimal safety requirements, this thesis follows an alternative approach. It 
aims to provide a design methodology for the design of safe ship structures 
through which safety would be raised as much as is economically sound, 
with regard to both the short- and long-term impact on life, the 
environment, and business. 
The following features of this thesis are believed to be original: 
1. A condition of MaSSCoR – maximum stakeholder satisfaction in 
competitive relationships to allow for a balanced distribution of costs and 
benefits related to design with added safety [P1] & [P4]; 
2. The Competitive Optimum – a solution concept for multi-stakeholder 
decision-making problems in engineering [P1] & [P4]; 
3. Converting constraints into additional objectives for the problem of the 
structural optimization of the ship, or vectorization [P2]; 
4. The application of an absolute function to the constraint conversion 
[P2]; 
5. Partial constraint grouping [P2]; 
6. A two-step procedure for optimization, permitting the use of time-
expensive response simulations of ship-to-ship collisions [P3]; 
7. Multi-objective optimization of tanker structures to maximise 
crashworthiness and minimise weight [P3], and 
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8. The selection of the optimal safe structure for a crashworthy tanker to 
maximise the concurrent satisfaction of stakeholder preferences [P4]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and objectives 
In this day and age the preservation of natural resources and sustainable 
development are of the utmost importance to society. Maritime transport 
plays a major role in this agenda. It is the most efficient mode of transport 
and thus a critical element of the world’s sustainability. 
Ships, as the fundamental means of maritime transport, carry cargo and 
serve both a commercial and a societal function. As a part of the global 
system, ships ‘feed’ their stakeholders: the yards that produce and maintain 
them, the owners that order and operate them, the charterers that use them 
to move goods, and the public that enjoys their continuous support of the 
supply chain. 
In the long term ships are not only profitable, but they enhance profit-
making. Yet they emit greenhouse gases, harm the environment with alien 
microorganisms through the ballast water, and have the capacity to 
abruptly change the environment through some catastrophic accident. Thus 
the public today are less and less tolerant towards the transportation of 
pollutant cargo, such as crude oil and its products, even though it is 
essential to their way of life. 
One of the key elements in the management of these risks and benefits is 
ship design, including the design of ship structures. The design of ship 
structures is performed with the aim of the vessel satisfying commercial 
requirements, abiding by the IMO and Flag State regulations, and following 
the industry rules set by the Class societies. These rules and regulations 
determine the minimum safety requirements, and combining them with 
profitability presents a challenging task.  
The ISO standard (2009) defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives. Risk is typically quantified as a product of the casualty damage 
caused by an adverse event, and the probability of its occurring  
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Table 1. Historical perspective on the improvements in the minimum 
requirements of safety 
Incident Type of Accident 
Convention 
instated/ 
updated Measures instigated 
    
Titanic 
(1912) 
Collision with iceberg 
and loss of 1517 lives as a 
result of poor 
organisation of 
disembarkation and lack 
of lifeboats. 
SOLAS 
(1914) 
Watertight subdivision 
    
Torrey 
Canyon 
(1967) 
Grounding and spillage 
of 120,000t of crude 
CLC (1969) 
MARPOL 
(1973) 
Compulsory liability for 
damage imposed on the 
owner/Segregated 
ballast tanks for all new 
tankers w/t 70,000+ 
DWT 
    
Amoco 
Cadiz 
(1978) 
Grounding and spillage 
of 250,000t with claims 
of $2bn. presented by 
the French government  
MARPOL 
(1978) 
Segregated ballast tanks 
for all new tankers w/t 
20,000+ DWT with 
protective arrangement 
    
Herald of 
Free 
Enterpris
e (1987) 
Flooding and capsizing 
with the loss of 193 lives 
ISM / SOLAS 
Ch. II-1 
(1990) 
 
Operational safety 
management/Watertigh
t subdivision of garage 
decks 
    
Exxon 
Valdez 
(1989) 
Grounding and spillage 
of 40,000t with damage 
of $3bn. 
OPA (1990)/ 
MARPOL 
(1992) 
All ships entering US 
waters to have double 
hulls/Double hull or 
risk-equivalent 
alternative arrangement 
for all newly-built ships 
    
Scandinav
ian Star 
(1990) 
Fire with the loss of 158 
lives 
SOLAS Ch. 
II-2 
Requirements for fire 
zone subdivision 
    
Bulk 
carrier 
lost in the 
early ’90s. 
Flooding and breaking SOLAS Ch. 
XII (1997) 
Bulk carriers to have 
sufficient strength to 
undergo partial flooding 
of compartments 
    
Estonia 
(1994) 
Flooding and capsizing 
with the loss of 852 lives 
SOLAS Ch. 
II-1 (1995) 
Requirements for 
flooding tolerance, 
instigated in SOLAS 
(1990), to be applied to 
existing ships and also 
newly-built ships 
    
Erika 
(1999) 
Breaking of hull and 
spillage of 20,000t with 
some €840 mil. worth of 
damage 
EU EMSA 
(2002) 
Accelerated phase-out of 
single-hull tankers 
    
Prestige 
(2002) 
Breaking of hull and 
spillage of 
approximately 60,000t 
of crude with total 
damage claimed of more 
than $2.5bn 
Resolution 
on places of 
refuge 
(2003) 
Ship in distress should 
be accepted to a harbour 
providing a controlled 
environment 
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(Slovic 1987). Safety, on the other hand, represents a condition of being 
protected from an adverse event (Oxford 2005). Safety is thus not 
quantifiable, but it can be ranked – with risk.  
For ships, adverse events lead to problems such as loss of life, injury, and 
material and environmental damage. Thus their risks are regularly 
computed in order to check whether they are tolerable and determine 
whether the ship is safe from any accident. Minimum safety requirements 
in that case set the criteria that assure that the tolerable level of risk is not 
surpassed. Profit, as a measure of commerciality, especially short-term 
profit, is directly opposed to this definition of safety. For this reason, ships 
are designed to meet the minimum safety requirements.  
There are two aspects of such a design approach that make it 
unsustainable. The first is the increased sensitivity to accident events as a 
result of the minimised safety margin. The tolerable levels of risk that 
determine the minimum safety requirements are often established 
empirically on the basis of historical observations. Thus, the minimum 
safety requirements are predominantly prescriptive, and they are by default 
limited by the present state of the art in technology and knowledge. The 
proof of this lack of sustainability can be found throughout maritime 
history. Every new major accident causes the minimum requirements to be 
raised in order to avoid similar events in the future. Remember the ‘Torrey 
Canyon’ accident that led to the CLC and, eventually, the MARPOL 
conventions (IPIECA/ITOPF 2007), and the incident of the ‘Exxon Valdez’, 
which, some 20 years later, caused the very same MARPOL to be updated, 
and also led to the OPA in the USA. See Table 1 below for a historical 
overview of improvements in the minimum safety requirements related to 
the design of ship structures. 
The second aspect of a lack of sustainability is more profound. The 
distributions of the risks and benefits of maritime transport are not 
balanced between the maritime stakeholders. While those involved in the 
industry share the direct benefits of the trade, the public mostly fears the 
risks of accidents. The evidence for this can be found e.g. from the limits of 
liability to the damage caused by an accident defined by the CLC’92 
(IPIECA/ITOPF 2007). Besides the potentially enormous damage to the 
public, this often causes disruptions to further developments of maritime 
transport. The public outcry regularly becomes irrational and is sometimes 
driven strictly by emotions, which in the end also influences strategic 
decision making1. Thus, ships should contribute to the sustainable 
                                                           
1Not world-famous, but a perfect example of the above argument is the case of the 
Croatian government project Druzba Adria (2002-2005), through which Russian 
crude oil would had been exported by tankers from the North Adriatic, where it 
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development of maritime transport by providing either more benefits, i.e. 
being more efficient in trade, or being safer with regard to the preferences 
of all maritime stakeholders. 
Since no similar method is known by the author to exist, the objective of 
this thesis is to provide a design method for safe ship structures that 
bridges the aspects of the lack of sustainability of the present design 
approach. The method should therefore help to define safer and more cost-
effective designs with a better balance between the risks and benefits facing 
the stakeholders in maritime transport. To define the method, the following 
elementary research question is to be investigated: 
‘How can a safe ship structure be optimally designed for the varying 
preferences of multiple stakeholders when the distribution of risks and 
benefits amongst them is unbalanced?’ 
The method focuses on safe ship structures and their safety in accidental 
events, more precisely adverse collision and grounding events. It is based 
on the following research fields: i) maritime safety; ii) Game Theory; iii) 
ship structural optimization for multiple objectives, and iv) collisions and 
grounding of ships. The following state of the art outlines their research gap 
relevant to the objective of this thesis. 
1.2. State of the Art 
1.2.1. Maritime safety 
As indicated by the IMO (2002) and the research community (Cho et al. 
2006, Moore et al. 2009), to correctly undertake the establishment of 
maritime safety criteria, it is necessary to consider the maritime 
stakeholders and their preferences. Freeman (1984) describes stakeholders 
as actors whose interests in a system need to be addressed, while Roy 
(1996) notes that stakeholders demonstrate preferences towards options 
                                                                                                                                                    
would arrive by a pipeline. The project, after many years of planning, infamously 
failed as a result of the intensive public outcry for the protection of the 
environment. Counter-initiatives were strictly conducted in Croatia, and nothing 
similar occurred in any other country with a shoreline touching the Adriatic. On the 
other hand, no specific measures were taken by the government or industrial 
stakeholders to implement safer operations beyond the minimum requirements of 
industry standards and international conventions. The irony of such an outcome is 
in the fact that during the time of the planning of the project, and still today, a very 
intensive import traffic of Arabian oil was conducted at the harbour of Trieste, 
Italy, also located in the North Adriatic. And no protests were heard. We can only 
wonder whether the outcome would have been different if the government and 
industry had had the capacity and willingness to implement e.g. ships with 
improved crashworthiness. 
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related to a system. In that sense, we can also observe the maritime 
stakeholders and their preferences regarding safety. All maritime 
stakeholders consider safety extensively in their activities, but they 
obviously do not possess the same preferences concerning it, e.g. how much 
is to be invested into averting a life lost or a ton of oil spilled. 
Not everybody benefits from safety equally, and nor does everybody have 
a chance to manage safety in the maritime industry. For example, ship 
owners manage safety directly through operations, while the yard has the 
responsibility to meet the minimum requirements in designing and 
building a ‘safe’ product. The minimum requirements are elicited, on the 
other hand, through a stakeholder dialogue, which includes the industry 
and the regulators with the mandate of serving society overall. Because of 
their roles in society, the risks and profits they face differ significantly, and 
so do their preferences. This inevitably leads to a different ranking of 
priorities.  
Bennett (2001) and Pöyhönen (2000) describe typical examples of these 
preferences. Their findings could be summed up as follows. The commercial 
aspects are primarily considered relevant by the industry, while society and 
individual professionals like seamen are more interested in improving 
safety but without any great willingness to bear the economic burden. 
A number of studies seek to establish criteria that follow these findings 
(Vatn 1998, Melchers 2001, Aven 2003). By formally establishing the 
maximum tolerance of risk for the public, i.e. the minimum safety 
requirements, and the maximum for efficient investments into safety, a so-
called ‘As Low As Reasonably Possible’ or ALARP region of relevant 
strategies for safety management can be established; see Figure 2.  
The determination of the maximum risk tolerance and of the maximum 
for efficient investments differs among the studies. Ditlevsen (2003) 
employs profiling of the nature of maritime risk, i.e. critical intolerance of 
high-consequence accidents that possess low occurrence, to establish the 
minimum acceptable levels of safety. Skjong and Ronold (1998), on the 
other hand, use a Life Quality Index (Lind 1996) to establish how much 
should be maximally invested into the prevention of the loss of life. A so-
called ‘upper bound criterion’ of Implied Cost of Averted Fatality, or ICAF 
threshold, is defined on the premise of the economic activity of a life lost. 
Depending on the area of operations observed, or persons’ origin, this value 
ranges between 300 k€ and about 3 M€. Should the investment into safety 
be efficient, the CAF, or the Cost to Avert the Fatality, defined as the ratio 
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Figure 1. ALARP – ‘as low as reasonably practical’ probabilities (Melchers 
2001) with typical risk acceptance frequency for the number of fatalities 
(Pedersen 2010)  
 
between the costs of investment in reducing the risk of loss of life and the 
expected reduction in loss of life, needs to be smaller than the threshold 
value of ICAF. Ditlevsen and Friis-Hansen (2003), combining the works 
above, establish a decision criterion for the acceptance of risk by the public 
to determine the threshold of the maximum amount to be invested into the 
aversion of environmental loss. The criterion is based on the balance 
between the benefits of maritime transport to the public and the risks it 
brings to the public. Following this work, and the work of Skjong and 
Vanem (2005), the IMO (2008) established the threshold of Cost to Avert a 
Tonne of Spillage, or CATSthr, at about 50 k€. CATS2 itself is established 
analogously to CAF. 
ICAF and CATSthr are very straightforward values for determining the 
efficiency of the investments being considered, but they lack the capacity to 
distinguish between low and high risks, as well as between the particular 
preferences of maritime stakeholders, which are relevant from the point of 
view of this study. They lack the capacity to determine the optimum amount 
of investments into safety, i.e. that the design alternative approaching the 
                                                           
2Here CATS refers not to the threshold, but to the ratio between the costs of 
investment and the tons of spillage averted.  
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threshold would be considered optimal. Furthermore, the values of CAF 
and CATS should not be used as criteria, i.e. the less the better, as they can 
produce very misleading figures, where their minima can be found e.g. for 
very ‘cheap’ alternatives with a minimum of risk reduction. The opposite, 
i.e. to maximise CAF and CATS, is irrational. ICAF and CATSthr are also 
determined in general, so they lack the sensitivity to capture the aspects of a 
particular ship project. Thus, they can be misleading if applied alone. 
As an alternative, Rosqvist and Tuominen (2004) and French et al. 
(2005) consider a multi-attribute decision-making framework. Assuming 
full compensation for the costs and benefits of safety investments amongst 
the stakeholders, they establish a more rational framework to determine the 
optimal amount of investment. No firm or predetermined thresholds are 
implied, as the selection is based strictly on the preferences of stakeholders. 
On this basis, and on the IMO’s (IMO 2002) recommendation for the fair 
treatment of stakeholders’ preferences, Rosqvist (2003) provides a 
selection criterion where the optimum of safety investments is found for the 
design alternative with the fairest distribution of the corresponding risks 
between the stakeholders. 
The validity of the assumption of full compensation amongst stakeholders 
is reasonable if one considers a very broad domain of stakeholders. Enough 
stakeholders make up the total economics of maritime transport and are 
thus part of the fully compensated system. Such a situation then easily 
correlates with safety as defined in international conventions, industry 
standards, and practices, e.g. when considering the updating of statutory 
rules. Within a narrower context, e.g. the structural design of a ship, the 
validity of the assumption about full compensation amongst stakeholders 
comes in question. The number of stakeholders involved, i.e. those sensitive 
to the changes in structural design, is smaller. Obviously, these represent 
only a part of the total economics, and the assumption of full compensation 
can no longer be guaranteed. Hence, an alternative approach should be 
considered. 
1.2.2. Game Theory 
Vincent and Grantham (1981) show how a design process can be described 
as a decision-making problem. Designing to satisfy the preferences of 
multiple stakeholders can then be seen as a group decision-making 
problem, where each stakeholder is treated as a decision maker. 
Differing preferences lead to competitive relationships between 
stakeholders (Håkansson and Henders 1990). In such relationships, 
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stakeholders are not willing to renounce any of their benefits as they try to 
maximise them independently (Duetsch 1949, Wilkinson and Young 1994). 
Such a decision-making problem is formalised effectively through the 
theory of mathematical games, or Game Theory (v Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944, Meyerson 1991, Keeney and Raiffa 1977). Two types of 
games can be distinguished. A static game describes a situation in which 
each stakeholder makes a choice from a fixed set of strategies, and where 
this set does not depend on the choices made by other stakeholders. A 
dynamic game, on the other hand, possesses varying sets of strategies, 
which depend on the choices made. A dynamic game obviously assumes 
that the choices are made at least twice, and thus it can, in a simplified 
manner, be understood as a series of static games. 
According to the above definition, ship design is a dynamic process. Thus, 
utilising a dynamic game would be the most appropriate way to map it and 
thus solve it. However, ship design is also complex, and the elicitation of the 
available strategies and consequences of the choices made cannot be 
defined explicitly. Similarly to the game of chess, it cannot be mapped, but 
it can be tackled.  
Maritime stakeholders, through preferences, trade off between the costs 
and benefits they face with a ship either in production or in operation. In 
the case of safety, this refers to the cost-effectiveness of any risk control 
option that is considered. Therefore, a single static game can be derived in 
such a way that it models the cost-effectiveness of the alternatives and 
allows the selection of one option that optimally satisfies all stakeholder 
preferences, as shown in Figure 2. 
The ‘dynamic’ part of the design decision making can be approximated 
with design optimization; again, see Figure 2. If we are aiming to select the 
best design alternative, then the alternatives that are considered should be 
good solutions. 
 
Figure 2. Design decision-making process modelled as a) a dynamic and 
b) a static mathematical game with the Nash Equilibrium marked. 
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Speaking in terms of multi-objective optimization, design alternatives 
considered for selection through a static game should be non-dominated 
solutions of the optimization problem. The non-dominated solutions, or 
Pareto optima, possess attributes that are not entirely outranked 
(dominated) by any other alternative under consideration (Pareto 1896). 
Extending this to the utilities of stakeholders, the non-dominated design 
alternatives effectively become compromise solutions between stakeholder 
preferences. In terms of group decision making, they are collectively stable 
solutions (Rao et al. 1997), i.e. their attributes and utilities cannot all be 
simultaneously improved by any alterations in order to reach a new feasible 
design.  
Depending on the nature of the game, a static game possesses several 
well-known solutions, e.g. Min-Max, Bayesian, etc. For the competitive 
games, the classic solution of Nash (Nash 1951), better known as Nash 
Equilibrium, is considered often. It is defined as the outcome of the optimal 
choice of strategies of stakeholders in their response to the optimal choices 
of others. Such a solution can be defined as ‘individually stable’ (Rao et al. 
1997), referring to the fact that no unilateral decision by any stakeholder 
will result in higher benefits for that stakeholder than at the Nash 
Equilibrium. 
In this case, the Nash Equilibrium will yield an alternative that optimally 
distributes the benefits and costs related to the risk reduction amongst the 
stakeholders. However, Dubey (1986) shows that the Nash Equilibrium of a 
static competitive game will probably be a non-efficient solution. Saksala 
(2005) vividly depicted this ‘anomaly3’ for a number of cases in structural 
design. Such an outcome is then irrational with respect to the 
considerations of ship design in general, as another alternative can provide 
more benefits to all stakeholders than the Nash Equilibrium. Special care 
should thus be taken when considering the application of Nash 
Equilibrium. 
1.2.3. Ship structural optimization for multiple objectives 
The optimization of marine structures has been investigated extensively 
since the 1960s, from the initial papers of Moses (1964), Kavlie et al. (1966), 
Moe and Lund (1968), and Moses and Onoda (1969), which considered 
classical methods, via the works of Hughes et al. (1980) and Rigo and 
Fleury (2001), which advanced these methods, to the applications of 
                                                           
3It is a disturbing fact that some economic equilibrium, in this case a fair solution, 
is at the same time irrational, since concurrently another solution exists from 
which all the stakeholders profit more. 
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evolutionary optimization methods, such as genetic algorithms. As a result 
of this effort many interesting features of the problem of the structural 
optimization of ships have come to light. We are e.g. familiar with the 
principles of how to make lightweight marine structures – reducing the 
stiffener spacing to reduce the plating thickness and stiffener size.  
However, in principle there has been a significant lack of investigations 
into optimising ship structures for other objectives. Several studies only 
focused on the optimization of production costs, e.g. Rigo (2001), Richir et 
al. (2007), or reliability, e.g. Zanic et al. (2006). For this reason there is a 
lack of sufficient experience of ways to improve a ship structure with 
respect to any other objective but weight. This indicates a gap in the 
optimization methodology that is capable of optimising ship structures for 
various objectives other than weight, and also concurrently with weight. 
Classical ‘text-book’ optimization methods, like the method of feasible 
directions, or conjugated gradients (Rao 2007) are generally capable of 
solving only small engineering problems with up to 10 or so variables 
(Hughes et al. 1980), which is far from satisfying demands of ship 
structural optimization. Due to operations with first and second derivatives 
of objective and constraint functions, optimization in this case typically 
converges to local optima. And in cases involving large number of variables, 
there will be a plenty of local optima available and reaching the global 
optimum becomes more a matter of chance than calculations. Furthermore, 
the objectives and constraints in ship structural optimization are often not 
defined explicitly as functions of design variables, e.g. when using FEM. 
The variables are also often discrete, as for structural scantlings, so 
derivatives of objectives and constraints cannot be determined, and the 
classical methods do not apply. 
In that respect, the authors mentioned in the beginning of this section, 
approached amongst others, ship structural optimization by customizing 
classical optimization methods. This e.g. involved building-in problem 
information into the optimization method by sequential ‘smart’ 
simplification of the optimization problem (Rigo and Fleury 2001). Hughes 
et al. (1980) on the other hand simplified the original global ship 
optimization problem onto a series of stiffened panel level optimization 
problems, which are sequentially linearised. These strategies yielded 
successful problem solutions to many practical problems with hundreds of 
variables, and were thus implemented in commercial ship structural design 
software MAESTRO and LBR-5. However, problems remained with respect 
to discrete variables, or with optimization of more than a single objective, 
which continue to be solved indirectly. See more e.g. in Zanic et al. (2007) 
and Caprace et al. (2010). 
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Evolutionary algorithms, due to the different nature of operations have 
the capacity to solve very large practical problems of ship structural 
optimization directly. The most notable evolutionary algorithms, with a 
large base of applications, are the Genetic Algorithms (GA). Using the 
principles of evolutionary biology – the survival of the fittest, to generate 
better design alternatives, and genetics – the chromosome string, for the 
coding of variables, practically any structural optimization problem can be 
tackled. Unlike the classical methods, they concurrently operate with 
multiple alternatives, so they are more convenient for multi-objective 
optimization (Deb 2001), where they can generate a set of optimal 
alternatives in one calculation run. 
Amongst several advantages in comparison to classic methods, GAs 
demand, however, a much higher number of evaluations. This means that 
they generate during optimization many more design alternatives. If this 
were combined with the extremely time-consuming evaluations that are 
required to e.g. evaluate ship crashworthiness in collision and grounding, 
optimization with a GA becomes impractical unless the GA can be 
enhanced. 
Two elements come forward for the completion of this challenge. The first 
is to customise a GA that makes better use of functional information that 
enhances its search capabilities for the class of problems being considered, 
while the second is to hasten the evaluation of objectives and constraints.  
The enhancement strategies principally address how to utilise more 
information and force GA to make better decisions about which alternatives 
to consider and which to skip for the advancement to the optima. This is 
especially important from the perspective of multi-objective optimization, 
where there is a desire to attain as many optima as possible. Deb et al. 
(2002) in that sense propose practical techniques, such as crowding and 
non-dominated sorting strategies in their NSGA-II4 algorithm to attain a 
well-spread and well-populated set of optimal alternatives. However, to 
generate a large Pareto frontier in this way, which occurs if we aim to find 
the optima between the minimum permissible and maximum attainable 
safety, a large population is required of about three alternatives per design 
variable. A large-scale optimization problem with about 100 or more design 
variables cannot afford such a population size. On the contrary, the 
minimum possible population size is preferred, of e.g. 50 alternatives. Even 
though a GA applying the above-mentioned techniques will have a well-
spread frontier of alternatives, it will probably miss some of the ‘genetic 
                                                           
4 Combined with the advanced selection techniques, this GA has become presently 
one of the most applied optimization algorithms. 
 12 
material’ needed to progress efficiently towards the optima; see e.g. Jelovica 
and Klanac (2009). 
The main working principle of many GAs, including those mentioned 
above, is that they ignore infeasible solutions, even though these might be 
close to the boundary of feasibility and possess good values of objectives. 
The possibility of considering such alternatives and improving a GA’s 
efficiency can be attained with the conversion of constraints into additional 
objectives, in the approach called ‘vectorization’5. This approach has been 
exploited by several authors, such as Osyczka et al. (2000) and Deb (2001), 
and has shown success. However, it has not been studied deeply enough to 
depict the effects that the conversion of constraints into objectives has on 
the optimization process, and nor have all the opportunities provided by 
this approach been explored. It does offer more opportunities to raise the 
efficiency of GA optimization.  
1.2.4. Collisions and grounding of ships 
Structural design has already been exploited as a means to manage safety 
related to accidental loads and breaches of hulls. In the 20th century, 
nuclear-powered ships faced a clear danger if the reactor were to be 
physically damaged, e.g. by a ship-to-ship collision. Woisin (1979) 
described some rearrangements that would result in a higher tolerance of 
the collision energy of the side structures prior to undergoing breaching. 
These first investigations served the purpose not only of creating more 
crashworthy side structure designs, but also capturing the mechanics of 
ship-to-ship collisions. From that period the work of Minorsky (1959) 
should be noted, which established the proportional relationship between 
the capacity to absorb collision energy and the volume of the structure 
involved in deformation.  
McDermott et al. (1974) showed that the key element for ship structures 
to have an extended capacity to absorb energy is to permit the structure to 
undergo large membrane tension. Following this conclusion, a series of 
novel designs of both side and bottom structures have been and still are 
being investigated (Lehmann and Peschmann 2002, Ludolphy and Boon 
2000, vd Graaf et al. 2004, Naar et al. 2002, Klanac et al. 2005). Several of 
these can be seen in Figure 3 below. 
What all these studies have in common is that their concept developments 
focused on the definition of the topology of a novel crashworthy structure. 
                                                           
5The term ‘vectorization’ is based on the conversion of constraints into objectives, 
which as a consequence leads to their inclusion into the optimization vector, i.e. a 
vector of objectives to be optimised.  
  
Figure 3. Concepts of crashworthy structures
board an inland waterway gas carrier (Ludolphy and Boon 2000); b) X
core structure on board a RO
structure on board an inland waterway gas carrier (Klanac et al. 2005)
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Figure 4. Scope of the work: the basic research fields (in white) and 
contributions (in grey) 
 
For the Competitive Optimum three fundamental conditions of selection 
will suffice, i.e. i) non-dominance, ii) efficiency, and iii) maximal 
stakeholder satisfaction in competitive relationships (MaSSCoR). The latter 
ensures fairness. 
MaSSCoR is based on a Nash Equilibrium solution for static games, which 
provides the fairest distribution of benefits amongst stakeholders in 
competitive relationships. But since the Nash Equilibrium of a general 
static game can be dominated, and hence inefficient, a special static game is 
constructed assuring that the Nash Equilibrium identifies an alternative 
that suffices for the first two conditions of selection. To establish this game, 
we apply multi-objective structural optimization.  
Optimization allows the systematic exploration of the design possibilities, 
thus providing reassurance that the optimal alternatives that are attained 
are efficient. Since classical optimization methods lack the capacity to solve 
practical large-scale multi-objective problems, and the current GA 
optimization also demands a large number of functional evaluations, the 
thesis proposes a special GA based on vectorization in order to enhance the 
optimization process. This GA quickens the optimization by converting all 
design constraints into objectives, providing the necessary advantages in 
solving problems such as the optimization of ship crashworthiness. A 
systematic study is conducted on the effects of vectorization, i.e. constraints 
are not only converted to objectives, but also grouped and partially grouped 
to provide strategies for approaching large-scale and time-expensive 
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problems. In that sense a novel ‘two-step’ optimization procedure is 
proposed. 
Two case studies are conducted to illustrate the theoretical contributions 
that are addressed. The study on the design of a safe double bottom for a 
Ro-Pax ship with regard to grounding accidents features applications of 
multi-stakeholder decision making and selection of the double-bottom 
design that provides the best satisfaction of stakeholders’ preferences. Two 
stakeholders are considered, the yard and the ship owner. 
The study on the design of a safe tanker side structure with respect to 
collision accidents, similarly to the Ro-Pax study, features multi-
stakeholder decision-making analysis and design selection using the 
proposed criterion. The study also features multi-objective optimization of 
the mid-ship structure with the proposed GA to create the efficient design 
alternative from which the optimal alternative can finally be selected. The 
tanker is concurrently optimised for minimum weight and for maximum 
crashworthiness. Four stakeholders are identified as relevant decision 
makers, i.e. the yard, the ship owner, the cargo receiver, and the public. 
Risk analysis is performed, and the risk is defined for each of the efficient 
alternatives generated and for each of the four stakeholders. The related 
costs resulting from an increase in crashworthiness are also defined. 
1.4. Limitations 
The results of this thesis should be observed in the light of the assumptions 
that are considered, following the desire to focus on the early stages of the 
design of ship structures. 
The Competitive Optimum criterion is based on the concept of Nash 
Equilibrium, which guarantees fairness towards stakeholder preferences in 
design selection, and carries the limitation that the list of assumed 
attributes is not exhaustive. Furthermore, a fundamental element of the 
Competitive Optimum criterion is the shared perception of the ‘Ideal’ 
among the stakeholders. The Competitive Optimum solution will thus hold 
only as long as all stakeholders perceive all attributes of the ‘Ideal’ design 
alternative as a maximal fulfilment of their preferences. 
The stakeholder are assumed to be purely competitive, while their 
preferences are a product of perfect rational thinking with neutral attitude 
towards risk. This means that a stakeholder will base decisions purely on 
the expected value of an attribute. This principally holds for institutional 
and industrial stakeholders, while the public is typically more risk averse, 
i.e. the adverse expected attribute values are progressively less preferred. In 
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this thesis, however, the public is considered analogically to the 
institutional stakeholders, since their interests are described in terms of 
explicit monetary figures which is assumed to exclude emotional aspects 
that bring front already mentioned risk aversion.  
Risk is thus considered equivalent to expected utility6, and is calculated 
explicitly following the utility theory (v Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) 
as a value under uncertainty, i.e. it is a product of consequence costs and 
the probability that this consequence would occur.  
The proposed GA algorithm is based on the conversion of design 
constraints into objectives, i.e. vectorization. Two types of vectorization are 
studied in the thesis, absolute and Heaviside. For the optimization of tanker 
structures, Heaviside vectorization was applied. 
The ‘two-step’ optimization procedure is devised on the premise that the 
process of multi-objective optimization can be split into two phases if the 
following two types of objectives exist: i) easy to evaluate but difficult to 
optimise, e.g. the weight of the ship structure, and ii) difficult to evaluate, 
i.e. time-expensive but easy to optimise, e.g. ship crashworthiness. 
Independently of the fact that the proposed GA algorithm with 
vectorization, through the ‘two-step’ procedure, enhances the optimization 
of large-scale problems, the evaluation of crashworthiness during the 
optimization needs to be rapid. Thus, it is evaluated for a single critical 
collision scenario only. This is a major assumption, which necessitates 
further validation, and for this reason the practical outcome of the tanker 
case study is to be treated accordingly. 
  
                                                           
6Utility here is the colloquialism of the ‘expected utility’, and is used throughout the 
thesis for brevity.  
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2. The method 
There are two most important parts of the proposed design method. The 
first is the generation of safe design alternatives, and the second is the 
selection of ‘the safe’ alternative. The term ‘the safest’ is deliberately 
avoided. It strongly impedes other characteristics of such design 
alternatives, as it is clearly the one with the maximum risk reduction, but 
not necessarily the one with the best distribution of costs and benefits 
amongst the stakeholders related to this risk reduction. The method, on the 
other hand, results in exactly such an alternative. 
 
Figure 5. Scheme of the activities in the proposed methodology: leading 
from an adverse event scenario, e.g. collision or grounding, new optimal 
design alternatives are generated through multi-objective optimization; 
they are evaluated for safety (risk analysis) and from the commercial 
aspect and, finally, an alternative is selected following the multi-
stakeholder decision making and the Competitive Optimum criterion. 
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As mentioned, the method focuses on the structural design of the ship, 
providing support to designers in determining the best parameters of a 
structure they design. It is structured on a cycle, shown in Figure 5 above, 
that is initiated by the analysis of the casualty that is to be mitigated by 
improving safety. In cases where collisions or grounding are to be 
mitigated, the ship structure will be optimised for crashworthiness, though 
without forgetting the commercial aspects of design objectives, e.g. the 
weight of the ship hull. Following up on this multi-objective optimization, 
the safe structures that are generated need to be checked for stakeholder 
preferences, i.e. the costs and benefits of safety investments need to be 
evaluated exactly. This demands both risk and economic analysis of the 
impact of the increased crashworthiness. Finally, a safe ship structure can 
be identified. As with any other method used in ship design, this process 
can be repeated as many times as is found necessary by the designers. 
2.1. Generation of efficient design alternatives 
Designing ship structures involves a series of decisions to satisfy owner 
requirements, class rules, and regulations. The shipyard’s production 
capabilities need to be accounted for as well. Thus, the set of efficient 
alternatives has to be found using e.g. multi-objective optimization. Finding 
these alternatives is important if we are to attain general conclusions about 
some technology, concept, methodology, etc. More precisely, efficient 
solutions as members of a Pareto frontier indicate the sensitiveness of 
design objectives to design parameters [P3].  
The success of multi-objective optimization in attaining a well-developed 
Pareto frontier, i.e. having a large number of optimal alternatives well 
spread between objectives optima, depends on the optimization system that 
involves an optimization algorithm and computational tools for the 
evaluation of design objectives/attributes and constraints. If such a system 
can be properly established, then reaching a Pareto frontier should be a 
matter of calculation and not of chance. 
The design optimization of ship structures is characterised by its design 
space. It features a multitude of design parameters, often 100 or more, 
which are also discrete, and a large number of non-linear constraints that 
create cavities in the design space, making it particularly difficult for an 
optimiser to search for the objectives minima. 
In [P2] and [P3], a special GA is proposed to tackle the optimization of 
ship structures more efficiently. The principle on which it works mimics the 
evolution of design. From a set of alternatives, good characteristics are 
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noticed, and these are mixed to generate new alternatives. The algorithm, 
based on the evolutionary principles of the survival of the fittest, makes 
decisions from generation to generation about which design information 
can lead to a Pareto frontier, and thus eventually progresses to the solution. 
This process is very robust in terms of its ability to find good solutions. On 
the other hand, it can be time-expensive, sometimes requesting a high 
number of functional calls. Paper [P2] thus studies the concept of 
vectorization. Vectorization enhances the use of information on problem 
objectives and constraints by the algorithm. In this way, constraints are 
transformed into additional objectives. This adds significant flexibility to 
the process of optimization. In brief, the algorithm can consider a design as 
a relevant solution, even though it might be slightly infeasible. Since the 
boundaries are never absolute this effectively does not directly impede the 
safety of the system. On the other hand, it serves as a basis for bridging the 
cavities that plague the design space more easily. This then quickens the 
search for optima.  
In [P3], vectorization is applied as a basis for the new approach to address 
a specific problem connected to the optimization of ship crashworthiness. 
Since crashworthiness is calculated with numerical collision simulations, 
which tend to be extremely time-consuming, the optimization problem is 
solved in two stages in order to reduce the number of evaluations of 
crashworthiness. As a result of the conversion of constraints into objectives, 
vectorization makes possible a directed search during optimization. 
Therefore, in the first step it is employed to find the minimum structural 
mass, while ignoring the crashworthiness. This is a more difficult part of 
optimization, since the minimum mass depends on the constraints, and is 
often ‘hidden’ in cavities, which demands a large number of functional 
evaluations. The second step involves the maximisation of crashworthiness 
alongside the minimisation of mass. Since the minimum mass is a member 
of the Pareto frontier, the algorithm, now in its search for the maximum 
crashworthiness, generates optimal Pareto alternatives along the way. 
Maximum crashworthiness generally involves a stiffer structure, and thus 
searching for it is less demanding for the algorithm than minimising mass. 
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2.2. The Competitive Optimum: selecting the safe ship 
structure 
In [P1]7, a static game is defined, the solution of which is a design 
alternative that has the optimal amount of safety for the set of alternatives 
being considered. The game is structured around stakeholders and, more 
particularly, around their strategies. The strategies model the importance of 
stakeholders’ preferences, or better to say the necessity that these are 
satisfied. The model is continuous, and in it strategies range between the 
absolute necessity to select some stakeholder preference or that this 
preference is irrelevant to the overall decision making. Such a game then 
allows a wide range of possibilities of modelling different scenarios, for 
example, that the preferences of all stakeholders are to be taken into 
account equally or that a certain stakeholder has greater importance than 
another. This can then represent, for example, the effect of negotiations 
where one stakeholder overpowers another, or where the preferences of a 
certain stakeholder are only partially accounted for.  
The strategies are established in such a way that any given combination 
strictly yields a Pareto optimal design alternative, either feasible or 
infeasible, and that every Pareto optimal alternative under consideration 
for selection is the result of at least one combination of chosen strategies, as 
proven in [P1] and [P4]. In this case the Nash Equilibrium will, by default, 
be Pareto optimal, and we can conclude that the Nash Equilibrium, 
indicating the optimal amount of safety, will be both an individually and a 
collectively stable solution. The Nash Equilibrium of this game thus 
indicates the best possible compromise solution amongst the stakeholders 
for any design scenario that is considered.  
The game, however, consists of both feasible and infeasible alternatives. 
Of course, only a feasible choice is acceptable, and since the Nash 
Equilibrium, by definition, cannot differentiate between the two, an 
alternative solution is proposed. It is named the Competitive Optimum, and 
it is an alternative displaced from the Nash Equilibrium, should it be 
infeasible, such that it is no worse than the Nash Equilibrium for any 
stakeholder, and for at least one, it is better. If the Nash Equilibrium is 
feasible, then it is also the Competitive Optimum. As such, the Competitive 
Optimum is adopted as the final criterion for selection in the design of safe 
ship structures. 
                                                           
7In [P4] the definition of this game is extended from two to three or more 
stakeholders.  
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3. Discussion 
The Competitive Optimum design maximally concurrently satisfies the 
preferences of stakeholders, and thus minimizes the negative effect of 
unbalanced distributions of risks. As mentioned earlier, risk distribution is 
unbalanced as a result of the scheme of liabilities determined according to 
the maritime conventions, namely the CLC 1992 and the IOPC 1992 fund. 
These determine the maximum liability of either the ship owner or the 
cargo owner in a maritime accident. The remaining costs, which are not 
covered by these liability limitations, are effectively taken on by the public, 
e.g. through the actions of the government, such as supportive measures to 
the affected parts of the public for their losses.  
Besides the value that might be lost, it is obvious that any accident 
involving pollution will have both an immediate and a long-lasting impact 
on the stakeholders. This is especially valid for the public, as the pollution 
would change the local way of life, business, etc. On the other hand, the 
benefits of tolerating the same risk are explicit and direct for the ship and 
cargo owners only, while they are implicit for the public. Furthermore, 
some parts of the public, in particular those belonging to the countries 
excluded from the supply chain, do not partake in its benefits at all.  
The results of the case study in Paper 4 indicate a severe imbalance in risk 
distribution amongst stakeholders, confirming and justifying the fear that 
the public expresses towards the transportation of pollutants. Figure 6 
interprets this statement graphically, indicating the principal 
environmental risk distribution.  
As shown in Figure 6, an additional imbalance amongst stakeholders is 
exerted by the distribution of influence on risk management. The public has 
a very low influence on risk management, principally setting only the 
minimum requirements through the actions of its representatives in the 
IMO or their Flag States. The biggest impact and responsibility is on the  
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Figure 6. Principal distributio
stakeholders for a small to medium tanker size (40 to 75 thousand tons 
DWT), and the influence of these stakeholders on risk management.
 
yard designing and building the structure, while the impacts of ship and
cargo owners on risk management are inversely proportional to their share 
of the risk. Such a situation is not a coincidence, nor is it unjustifiable. 
Ultimately, yards and owners finance and invest in the building of the 
marine structure, while the public obviously 
stakeholders face competition and potentially disturbing market changes. 
Mostly for these reasons, and because of the low risk they face, yards and 
owners favour a conservative approach in design and do not typically 
pursue safety improvements beyond the set minimum requirements. Thus 
it becomes critical to address the preferences of the public during every 
particular design exercise if one is to justify a safer design on economic 
grounds. Speaking technically, the key element i
facing stakeholders for every design alternative considered.
The advances in decision making and design optimization described here 
help us to realise the general implications of the proposed methodology for 
the future design of ship structures. Observing the results of practical case 
studies, presented in [P3] and [P4], it can be concluded that the design of 
safe ship structures is reasonable only if it is observed holistically, i.e. if all 
the relevant stakeholders are considered 
Otherwise, if only those stakeholders who manage risks directly are 
considered, it is reasonable to maintain the actual design strategy for the 
minimum requirements.  
The results of the case studies clearly indicate that the enviro
is directly related to the crashworthiness of the ship hull, where an increase 
in crashworthiness reduces the cargo capacity as a result of the increased 
hull weight, leading eventually to reduced transport profitability. This loss 
ultimately needs to be compensated for if we are to design for an 
economically stable solution. This compensation is provided by the public, 
as it benefits significantly from the improved crashworthiness as a result of 
its much higher risk exposure than the other sta
n of the environmental risk among 
 
does not. Furthermore, these 
s to determine the risks 
 
during design selection. 
nmental risk 
keholders. 
 
 
 23 
The results also indicate the way the safe ship structure should be 
designed, or improved from the present-day state of the art. For example, 
they show that the most efficient way of increasing safety against grounding 
in the case of a Ro-Pax vessel is to stiffen the bottom shell structure. A 
similar but more profound aspect is indicated for tanker safety against 
collisions, and that is to stiffen only a critical area of the outer shell, below 
the waterline and above the bilge, while leaving the remainder of the 
structure as flexible as possible. 
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4. Conclusion 
This thesis proposed a method for the design of safe ship structures. With a 
focus on accident safety, the method is based on a newly established multi-
objective optimization approach for large-scale and time-expensive 
problems and on a new design selection criterion considering multiple 
stakeholder preferences in a realistic economic environment. 
The new approach to multi-objective optimization is based on a ‘two-step’ 
procedure using a special GA with vectorised problem formulation. The 
design selection approach is based on a new criterion, the Competitive 
Optimum, which combines non-dominance, efficiency, and fairness, 
established through the condition of maximal stakeholder satisfaction in 
the competitive relationships.  
Each of these contributions is illustrated with practical studies, i.e. the 
design selection of a safe Ro-Pax double bottom structure for grounding, 
and the optimization and design selection of a safe tanker structure for 
collisions. The case studies resulted in the following set of general design 
implications. 
i) By increasing ship crashworthiness, a significant risk reduction can 
be attained.  
ii) Raising safety is economically justified if the benefits to the public 
are considered alongside those to industry.  
iii) The crashworthiness of ships can be effectively controlled with 
conventional double-bottom and double-sided structures. 
The attainment of such results obviously calls for further research. An 
obvious step to follow this thesis would be to perform a certain number of 
new applications of the methodology, to different ship types, and, more 
profoundly, to different types of adverse events. A holistic overview of the 
structural safety of ships, with a spectrum of potential adverse events being 
considered, can also be envisioned. With the application of greater 
computing power, such as cluster or cloud computing, a more precise 
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assessment of the crashworthiness of ships could be performed, involving 
e.g. multiple collision simulations.  
Besides these design activities, efforts should be made to test different 
axiomatic definitions of the Competitive Optimum solution, where the 
distribution of risks and benefits of their mitigation is no longer as fair as 
possible, but different, e.g. dictatorial with respect to a certain stakeholder, 
or a consequence of a contract. 
In this respect a very handy application of the method could be for a 
reverse engineering type of study, where relevant maritime accidents could 
be investigated with respect to the satisfaction of stakeholder preferences, 
and the cause and effect of the accidents linked with an established design 
arrangement. This type of research activity should also focus on 
interviewing stakeholders, as it will produce a more realistic set of 
preferences, with significant implications of subjectivism and perceived 
valuation. A direct assessment of stakeholder preferences would ensure a 
higher level of validity of practical results. A combination of direct 
stakeholder preference assessments and applications to several practical 
case studies could also lead to the establishment of more general 
conclusions and yield a basis for new efficient and economically stable safe 
structural concepts. 
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